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Abstract
Effective
information
security
(InfoSec)
management cannot be achieved through only
technology; people are the weakest point in security
and their behaviors such as inappropriate use of
computer and network resources, file sharing habits
etc. cannot be controlled by security technologies.
Although the importance of individuals’ InfoSec
behaviors has been widely recognized, there is limited
understanding of what impact individual users InfoSec
protection behavior. Thus, focusing on the
relationships among risk propensity, InfoSec selfefficacy, InfoSec protection efforts from several
theoretical lenses, the study proposes a research
model to explain individuals’ intention to reinforce
their InfoSec protection and empirically validates the
proposed model. The results of the study are expected
to provide a deeper understanding of the relationships
among risk propensity, self-efficacy, risk perception,
InfoSec protection efforts, and InfoSec reinforcement
intention.

1. Introduction
With the increase of computer and Internet usage,
information security (InfoSec) has become an
important issue. In the US, the total average cost of
cyber-crime in 2015 was $15 million [23]. Previous
studies have been focused on using security
technologies to enhance InfoSec in organizations.
However, InfoSec cannot be achieved through
technology alone; effective organizational InfoSec
depends on all three components: people, processes,
and technology. People present a weak point in
security and their behaviors such as inappropriate use
of computer and network resources, file sharing habits
etc. cannot be controlled by security technologies [14].
Careless computing habits and improper online
behaviors can threaten not only the security and
privacy of their own personal data but also the safety
of organization information system structure.
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Although the importance of individual InfoSec
behavior has been recognized, there is limited
understanding of what impact computer users’ InfoSec
behavior [3]. There is a need for a sociotechnical
approach to InfoSec research. Therefore, this study
identifies the factors that impact on computer users’
protection intention. Focusing on the relationships
among risk propensity, InfoSec self-efficacy, InfoSec
risk perception, and InfoSec protection efforts from
several theoretical lenses, the study proposes a
research model to explain individuals’ intention to
protect their InfoSec and validates the proposed model
using empirical data. The results of the study are
expected to provide a deeper understanding of what
factors impact on InfoSec protection efforts and
InfoSec reinforcement intention.
More specifically, the study mainly focuses on two
research questions: 1) How does risk propensity
associate with InfoSec risk perception, InfoSec
protection effort and InfoSec reinforcement intention?
2) How does InfoSec self-efficacy associate with
InfoSec risk perception, InfoSec protection effort and
InfoSec reinforcement intention?
The paper is organized as follows: First, it begins
with literature review of InfoSec and theoretical
foundations. Next, we propose the research model and
hypotheses. Third, we present the research
methodology. Then, we analyze data and come up
with the results. This lead to explanation in discussion
part. The paper concludes with a discussion about the
limitations and future research opportunities.

2. Theoretical background
2.1 Information security
The term “Information Security” has many
definition covering technical, behavioral, managerial,
philosophical, and/or organizational approaches [31].
For the purpose of this research, we focus on the
behavioral aspect on an individual level, because the
human factor is a key component of InfoSec. In 2013,
according to US census bureau, 83.8 percent of US
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households owned a computer (desktop, laptop and
handheld computer), and 74.4 percent of US
household had internet access. Personal computers and
internet access are now necessary parts of daily life
and have become an important virtual setting for
everyday living and work. Individual computer users
are more vulnerable to InfoSec threats, because in the
home environment, individual computer users are not
required to comply with strict InfoSec policies, trained
to conduct safe computing, or protected by InfoSec
staffs like in a corporate environment. Therefore,
home computers are more exposed to security threats
like computer viruses, data loss, identity theft, etc.
The majority of InfoSec research focus on
employees’ security behavior in organization [29],
which is understandable since employee security
behavior significantly impact on organization. With
the increase of internet usage and technologies, more
people work at home or continue their work outside
the office. So personal computer becomes the work
computer but with less security protection, thus
behavioral InfoSec research has given more attention
to home computer users. Many studies conducted with
both employees and home users suggest that
preventive behavior are influenced by threat and
coping appraisal, which a key tenant of protection
motivation theory (PMT). When an individual is
aware of security threats, he or she will form beliefs
about the perceived severity and probability of the
threat, which are then evaluated against the beliefs
formed about the efficacy of potential response [3].
However, these factors are not sufficient to explain
what drives InfoSec protection intention.
Previous study indicates that a home computer
user’s intentions are formed by a combination of
cognitive, social, and psychological components [3].
They suggest that the most effective messages in the
context of online security behavior may be the
messages that focus on the positive outcomes of
performing security behavior, not the ones focus on
potential negative outcomes of not following the
security procedures. Other research by Ifinedo [16]
show that factors such as self-efficacy, attitude toward
compliance, subjective norms, response efficacy, and
perceived
vulnerability
positively
influence
information systems security policy behavioral
compliance intentions of employees.
Previous
research has found that personality constructs can be
used to explain even more variance in behavior,
providing understanding of user behavior. Therefore,
it is important to identify what type of personality that
affect security behavior and protection intention.

2.2 Theory of reasoned action and theory of
planned behavior
Our research model is based on the Theory of
Reasoned Action (TRA) by Ajzen and Fishbein (1969)
[1] and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) [2], the
two best known theoretical models of behavior. The
TRA proposes that human intention to perform or not
to perform an action (behavioral intention) is the
immediate antecedent of the actual behavior. The TRA
states there are two factors that affect behavioral
intention: attitude toward the behavior and subjective
norms. Attitude is defined as a person’s positive or
negative feelings toward performing the behavior.
Subjective norms is defined as a person’s perception
of what people important to them think about
performing a behavior.
The TPB extends the TRA developed by Ajzen
and Fishbein. This theory adds perceived behavioral
control as a factor that influences behavioral intention.
Perceived behavioral control is the perception of how
easy or difficult it would be to perform the behavior.
According to TPB, human behavioral intention is
affected by subjective norms, attitude towards the
behavior, and perceived behavioral control [2], and
each reveals a different aspect of the behavior and can
be used in attempts to change it. People are expected
to follow their intentions when they have motivation
and some actual control over the behavior in question.
Therefore, behavioral intentions are assumed to be the
immediate antecedent of actual behavior [2]. The TPB
is a useful conceptual framework for explaining the
complexity of human social behavior. It has been
widely used across differing domains.
The efficacy of the TRA model and the TPB
model is supported by many empirical research
studies, reviews [20] and meta-analyses [4]. In
InfoSec security domain, previous studies have
supported that a person’s intention to comply with an
information system security procedure is influenced
by his or her attitude, subjective norms, and perceived
behavioral control [13]. Therefore, numerous
information system security studies have used the TPB
to examine InfoSec behavior and individual’s
behavioral compliance with InfoSec policies [6].

2.3 Self-efficacy in information security
According to social cognitive theory, individuals
actively seek and interpret information, and use that
information to guide subsequent behaviors [22]. Selfefficacy is an important aspect of social cognitive
theory. Bendura [10] explains self-efficacy as a form
of self-evaluation which is determinant of individual
behavior, self-efficacy refers to one’s belief about his
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or her own capabilities to organize and execute the
actions successfully. In other word, self-efficacy is
what an individual believes he or she can achieve
using his or her knowledge, and skills. Self-efficacy
influences human motivation, the amount of effort,
self-regulation, and persistence of human efforts when
they face specific circumstances or obstacles [8].
Self-efficacy theory proposes that people are
more likely to engage in activities in which they have
a high level of self-efficacy [11]. In other words,
people’s motivation and courses of action are
determined by how people believe they can do the
work effectively [8]. Previous research on selfefficacy indicates that judgments of self-efficacy can
be measured along three basic scales: magnitude,
strength, and generality. Self-efficacy magnitude
measures the difficulty level of the task [11]. Selfefficacy strength measures the amount of conviction
an individual has about performing a specific task
[11]. Generality of self-efficacy refers to the extent to
which self-efficacy on one task generalizes to other
tasks in similar situations [19].
In the information systems context, Compeau and
Higgins define computer self-efficacy as an individual
judgment of one’s capability to use a computer [15].
Previous research on computer end-user behavior has
examined the role of computer self-efficacy [28].
Researchers in InfoSec have adapted the general term
computer self-efficacy to a specific construct: InfoSec
self-efficacy. InfoSec self-efficacy can be defined as
one’s belief in his or her capability to protect
information and information systems from security
threats, loss, unauthorized access, etc. [24]. Findings
from previous research indicate that people with a high
level of InfoSec self-efficacy use more security
software, set stronger passwords, and conduct InfoSec
practices frequently. In sum, InfoSec self-efficacy is
an important factor that impacts on users’ InfoSec
practices [16].

3. Research model and hypotheses
General technology awareness is defined as an
individual’s perception about the technological
abilities to control InfoSec in general. InfoSec selftechnical controllability can be defined as an
individual’s perception of his or her own technical
ability to control InfoSec threats. When individuals
notice that existing technologies are able to detect,
control, and prevent an InfoSec attack, they are more
likely to believe in the usefulness of the technologies.
In other words, having access to technologies and
knowing the effectiveness of technologies, individuals

will perceive that they have higher technical-control of
InfoSec threats. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: General technology awareness is
positively associated with InfoSec self-technical
controllability.
We define InfoSec self-efficacy as individuals’
beliefs about their ability to protect their information
and computer systems from InfoSec threats. Previous
research in the InfoSec domain has proved that
individuals who have a high level of perception in
technology’s abilities to control threats to InfoSec in
general will have stronger belief in their own abilities
to control InfoSec threats and protect their computers
at a personal level [24]. Thus, hypothesis H1b is
proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 1b: General technology awareness is
positively associated with InfoSec self-efficacy.
Because InfoSec self-technical controllability
measures how people perceive their technical abilities
to execute security practices to avoid InfoSec threats,
it would have an effect on individuals’ self-efficacy in
InfoSec. When people perceive that they have
technical abilities to conduct security practices, they
will believe more in their own abilities to control
InfoSec threats. People become more confident in
themselves and their abilities to handle InfoSec issues
when they perceive they have high technical
controllability. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis
2:
InfoSec
self-technical
controllability is positively associated with InfoSec
self-efficacy.
Information security protection effort is defined
as a set of current practices of computer users to
defend their valuable information from unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, etc. It includes InfoSec
practices such as installing and updating anti-virus
software on a personal computer, using a firewall on a
home network, using complicated passwords and
different passwords for different websites, making
back-up copies of important files frequently, etc. The
influence of self-efficacy on InfoSec protection
practice has been demonstrated in prior studies. Selfefficacy was found to be a significant predictor of the
decision of home wireless network users to implement
security features on their networks [30]. People with
higher self-efficacy in InfoSec are more likely to use
security protection software, they also demonstrate a
high level of security conscious care behavior [24].
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3a: InfoSec self-efficacy is positively
associated with InfoSec protection effort.
Information security risk perception is defined as
an individual’s belief about the chance of the
occurrence of an InfoSec risk to his or her computer
system. It’s about how individuals perceive the chance
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that their computer will face InfoSec breaches or how
vulnerable their computer systems are. Risk
compensation theory explains why people take risks.
It states that individuals adjust their level of risktaking behavior based on their sense of security [26].
Prior research on transportation safety argues that
adding safety features to cars (such as air bags,
seatbelts system, etc.) will encourage people to
abandon their defensive driving skills; for example,
they will increase their speed. The explanation is that
they feel protected by the vehicle and safety systems
[5]. While there is a debate about the support for risk
compensation theory, the theory is still valid in
predicting risk behavior in some situations. We argue
that when people feel protected, they perceive that
negative occurrences are less likely happen to them,
thus they are more willing to take that risky action. So
there is a relationship between people’s perception of
safety and their risk perception. We propose that when
individuals have high InfoSec self-efficacy, they
believe more in their abilities to control the InfoSec
threats. Thus, they feel safer when using their
computer systems. In other words, their perception of
an InfoSec risk to their computer systems decreases.
To conclude, we expect that individuals who have high
InfoSec self-efficacy are likely to have lower InfoSec
risk perception. Hypothesis 3b states this relationship:
Hypothesis 3b: InfoSec self-efficacy is negatively
associated with InfoSec risk perception.
Information security reinforcement intention
refers to individuals’ future intention to strengthen
their InfoSec protection practice. It implies that
individuals will implement stronger security
procedures, such as buying more software to protect
their computers from InfoSec breaches, learning more
about protection techniques, etc. Bandura [9] states
that self-efficacy is one of the most important
preconditions for behavior change because it

determines coping behavior. Prior studies show that
people’s behavior is strongly influenced by their
confidence in their abilities to perform certain
behaviors [7]. In the TPB, the concept of perceived
behavioral control is adapted from self-efficacy
theory. Thus, self-efficacy is one of the determinants
for future intention. In the computer use context,
researchers indicate that computer self-efficacy has an
effect on people’s intentions to use computers in the
future [21]. Rhee et al. [24] argue that intention to
exert effort is an indicator of future behavior, and their
findings support that individuals who have higher
InfoSec self-efficacy will have stronger intentions to
strengthen their InfoSec practices. Bulgurcu et al. [13]
state that there is a significant relationship between an
employee’s self-efficacy in complying with the
organization’s InfoSec policy and his or her intention
to comply. Consistent with their findings, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3c: InfoSec self-efficacy is positively
associated with InfoSec reinforcement intention.
Research on risk has been conducted in various
disciplines. In the information systems discipline, ecommerce area has studied how trust and risk affect
consumer’s intention and decision in online
transaction [24]. Online consumer perceived risk is a
consumer’s belief about the potential uncertain
negative outcomes from the online transaction [18].
Consumers’ belief plays an important factor in their
behavior. Previous research shows that consumer’s
trust and perceived risk have strong impacts on
purchasing decisions. For this study, we look at risk in
different aspect, by studying computer users’ risky
personality (risk propensity). For the purpose of this
study, we define risk propensity as an individual
current tendency to take risk; it is an individual trait
that can change over time and is an emergent property
of the decision maker. People who have high-risk
Information Security
Protection Effort

Self-technical
Controllability
H3a

H2
H1a

H5b

Information security
self-efficacy

H5a

H4a
General technology
awareness

Information Security
Reinforcement Intention

H3c

H1b
H3b
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Risk Propensity

H4b

Information Security
Risk Perception

Figure 1. Research Model
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propensity are more willing to do things that involve
risk in order to achieve their goals. The effect of risk
propensity on risky decision making were found to be
mediated by perception of risk [25]. While using the
Internet involves security threats like malware, data
loss, unauthorized access, etc. users can protect
themselves by using InfoSec protection solution.
High-risk propensity person would less likely to use
antivirus or malware prevention to prevent malicious
threats from executing. To state in other way, an
InfoSec protection practice would be viewed less
favorably by people who have high-risk propensity.
Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4a: Risk propensity is negatively
associated with InfoSec protection effort.
Some studies in risk literature support that
people’s risk perception in a specific situation is
influenced by their propensity to take or avoid risks
[12]. It means people who have risk-seeking
propensity will perceive less risk than who have riskaverse propensity. They tend to recognize positive
outcomes, overestimate the probability of gains, and
underestimate the probability of loss, so it leads to
lowering their risk perception. In other words, there is
a significant negative relationship between risk
propensity and risk perception [25]. However, other
studies found that there is no significant effect of risk
propensity on risk perception in decision making
situation [17]. In the InfoSec context, we argue that
people who have higher risk propensity level will
perceive less InfoSec risk. They are more likely to
underestimate InfoSec threats to their computers. The
next hypothesis posits this relationship:
Hypothesis 4b: Risk propensity is negatively
associated with InfoSec risk perception.
We propose that when individuals conduct strong
InfoSec procedures, they will perceive less security
threats toward their information systems. When people
have anti-virus software on their computers, use
wireless encryption feature in their wireless
connection, check and apply security updates
frequently, they will more likely to think that their
computer systems are well secured. Knowing that they
are being protected by different protection methods,
they would feel safer when using their computers.
They overlook the probability of risk, and they feel
that security breaches are less likely happen to them.
Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5a: InfoSec protection effort is
negatively associated with InfoSec risk perception.
When people have practiced InfoSec protection, it
means they already have positive attitude toward the
protection behavior and have knowledge about how to
protect their computers. They have certain belief that
their protection effort can help them to secure their

computers from security threats. According to the
TRA & the TPB, their belief and positive attitude will
impact on their intention to have InfoSec protection in
future. Because they already know how to conduct
InfoSec protection, they probably will continue
enforcing security procedure. At this point, they are
familiar with InfoSec procedure, they have more
knowledge about security techniques, so they probably
have stronger intention to continue InfoSec protection
in order to protect their computer better. They will not
only continue protect their computers but also put
more effort into protecting their information systems.
The more effort they put on current InfoSec protection,
the more likely they will strengthen their InfoSec
protection intention in future. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5b: InfoSec protection effort is
positively associated with InfoSec reinforcement
intention.
When people perceive risk, they want to reduce
risk. People who have weak InfoSec risk perception
will be less willing to conduct InfoSec protection
procedures. On the other hand, people who have
strong InfoSec risk perception are more likely to
protect their information systems. Thus, they have
stronger intention to conduct one or more InfoSec
protection procedures. We assume that when people
perceive more risk about their computer systems, they
are more likely to conduct stronger protection
procedures to protect their computers. Thus, we
propose that InfoSec risk perception has a positive
relationship with InfoSec reinforcement intention.
Hypothesis 6 states this relationship:
Hypothesis 6: InfoSec risk perception is positively
associated with InfoSec reinforcement intention.
The model summarizes the proposed research
hypotheses is presented in Figure 1.

4. Research method
4.1. Research design
To validate the propose research model, we had
collected data using a questionnaire from students in a
public university in the U.S. A total 248 respondents
completed the survey. After removing incomplete and
invalid responses, we have 244 usable responses. For
analysis tool, we use Partial Least Squares (PLS),
which utilizes a principle component-based for
estimation.
4.2. Measures
We use multi-item scales to improve reliability
and validity of measurement. InfoSec protection effort
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construct was operationalized using formative scale
items. Other constructs were operationalized using
reflective scale items. This survey was conducted at
the individual level. We captured demographic
variables including age, gender, major, and
employment status. Other control variables are
computer experience, internet experience, computer
ownership, computing literacy level, and internet
literacy level.

5. Data analysis and results
The research model is validated through two-step
analysis using SmartPLS 2.0. First, we test a
measurement model to ensure the validity and
reliability of measures before testing the proposed
hypotheses (i.e., structure model testing). Then we
conduct tests of significance for all paths using the
bootstrapping method.

Table 1. Construct correlations, consistency and reliability of reflective constructs
Construct

CR

Alpha

AVE

Construct
GTA

RI

RPE

SE

RP

SC

General Technology Awareness
0.740
0.783 0.582 0.548
(GTA)
0.857
InfoSec Reinforcement intention
0.917 0.878 0.735
0.100
(RI)
0.895
InfoSec Risk Perception (RPE)
0.942 0.916 0.801 -0.169 0.203
0.788
InfoSec Self-efficacy (SE)
0.947 0.938 0.620
0.443
0.152 -0.318
0.778
Risk Propensity (RP)
0.752 0.358 0.605 -0.064 0.024
0.131
-0.066
Self-technical Controllability (SC)
0.925 0.892 0.755
0.391
0.098 -0.255
0.567
-0.096 0.869
Note: 1) Composite reliability (CR), Cronbach’s Alpha (Alpha), Average valance extracted (AVE); 2) Bold numbers
on the diagonal are the square root of the AVE; 3) Off-diagonal elements are correlations among constructs.

Table 2. Loadings and cross-loadings

GTA_01
GTA_02
GTA_03
RI_01
RI_02
RI_03
RI_04
RPE_01
RPE_02
RPE_03
RPE_04
SE_01
SE_02
SE_03
SE_04
SE_05
SE_06
SE_07
SE_08
SE_09
SE_10
SE_11
RP_01
RP_02
SC_01
SC_02
SC_03
SC_04

General
Technology
Awareness (GTA)
0.6588
0.7664
0.7887
0.1046
0.0555
0.0337
0.1475
-0.0862
-0.1724
-0.1964
-0.1463
0.3053
0.2700
0.3227
0.4001
0.3546
0.3501
0.3716
0.3693
0.3056
0.3821
0.3957
-0.0789
-0.0111
0.4124
0.3519
0.2664
0.3199

InfoSec
Reinforcement
intention (RI)
0.1288
0.0736
0.0205
0.8925
0.9200
0.7831
0.8260
0.2147
0.1516
0.2307
0.1291
0.0250
0.0243
0.1620
0.1384
0.0852
0.1300
0.1622
0.2629
0.0741
0.1215
0.1111
0.0147
0.0244
0.0758
0.0575
0.1212
0.0841

InfoSec Risk
Perception
(RPE)
-0.1549
-0.1581
-0.0622
0.1699
0.1734
0.2291
0.1308
0.8249
0.9153
0.9359
0.9008
-0.2263
-0.2746
-0.2754
-0.2898
-0.2843
-0.3390
-0.2176
-0.2136
-0.2234
-0.2227
-0.1784
0.0727
0.1462
-0.2154
-0.2268
-0.2571
-0.1882

InfoSec
Self-efficacy
(SE)
0.3108
0.3408
0.3288
0.1446
0.1350
0.0776
0.1595
-0.2336
-0.3159
-0.2802
-0.3083
0.6860
0.7448
0.7883
0.8030
0.8284
0.8494
0.8222
0.8128
0.7475
0.8189
0.7468
-0.0726
-0.0225
0.4810
0.5048
0.5118
0.4729

Risk
Propensity
(RP)
-0.0369
-0.0941
-0.0123
0.0560
0.0333
-0.0549
0.0395
0.1692
0.1106
0.0656
0.1296
-0.1079
-0.0480
-0.0350
-0.0155
-0.0065
-0.0112
-0.1089
-0.0536
-0.0515
-0.0491
-0.0906
0.8538
0.6944
-0.0726
-0.0918
-0.0914
-0.0801

Self-technical
Controllability
(SC)
0.3122
0.2592
0.2927
0.1443
0.0977
0.0641
0.0227
-0.2158
-0.2297
-0.2127
-0.2566
0.4270
0.4509
0.5025
0.4688
0.4733
0.4717
0.4333
0.3779
0.4566
0.4097
0.4320
-0.0620
-0.0951
0.8673
0.9045
0.8310
0.8713
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The table of loadings and cross-loadings (table 2)
shows each item loading highest on its assigned latent
construct will all loadings above 0.5 (adequate value),
those with values lower than 0.5 were deleted from the
scales accordingly. In conclusion, the results show the
study’s measures are psychometrically adequate for
this study.
For formative construct, the validity is examined
by considering the results of a principal components
analysis (PCA) and item weightings. Items are
assumed to be valid if their weightings are significant.
We remove items that have no significant
weightings. Reliability is examined by considering
multi-collinearity among scale items by using variance
inflation factor (VIF). As shown in table 3, all of the
indicators’ VIF values are lower than 5. VIF analysis
indicates that the items are sufficiently reliable. In
conclusion, the formative construct is valid and
reliable.

5.1 Measurement model
The reliability and validity of the scales and
measurements items are evaluated. For reflective
constructs, the convergent validity is assessed by
examining individual item reliability and construct
reliability. The reliability of the scales is examined by
two indicators: composite reliability (CR) and
Cronbach’s alpha. The composite reliabilities for
each of the reflective constructs are all above the
recommended 0.7 level to indicate internal
consistency of the data. The Average Variance
Extracted (AVE) is a measure of convergent validity
and all AVE values in Table 1 are above the
recommend minimum of 0.50, which mean at least
50% of measurement variance is captured by the latent
construct.
Table 3. Error term, T-statistic, and VIF
scores for formative items
Standard
T-Statistics VIF
Error
PE_01 -0.0533
0.0632 0.8421 NS
1.6710
PE_02 0.1872
0.1061 1.7639 **
1.5520
PE_03 0.0924
0.0904 1.0224 NS
1.2780
PE_04 0.1797
0.0818 2.1976 **
1.1980
PE_05 0.2883
0.1026 2.8090 **
1.3620
PE_06 0.4175
0.0989 4.2211 ***
1.3340
PE_07 -0.0075
0.0972 0.0775 NS
1.2580
PE_08 0.1627
0.0971 1.6758 **
1.0650
PE_09 0.3092
0.0867 3.5663 ***
1.1000
Note: InfoSec protection effort (PE)
NS: not significant, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
Weight

5.2 Structural model
The structural model shows results about the path
significance of hypothesized relationships using the
path coefficients (β) and the squared R (R2). The
SmartPLS results for path coefficients and the R2 are
showed in figure 2. The path significance levels (tvalues) are calculated by bootstrapping method. Table
4 summarizes the βs, t-value, and the results of
hypothesis test. The results support hypotheses (H1a)

Control variables:
Age **
Gender (ns)
Computer experience (ns)
Internet experience (ns)
Computing literacy level *
Internet literacy level **
Information Security
Protection Effort
R-sq = 43.1%

Self-technical
Controllability
R-sq = 15.3%
β = 0.630 ***

β = 0.465 ***
β = 0.391 ***

General technology
awareness

β = 0.145 **

Information security
self-efficacy
R-sq = 37.9%
β = 0.261 ***

β = 0.193 **
β = 0.076 (ns)

β = - 0.144**
β = -0.356 ***

Risk Propensity

β = 0.122 *

Information Security
Reinforcement Intention
R-sq = 15.1%

β = 0.259 ***

Information Security
Risk Perception
R-sq = 11.7%

Figure 2. PLS Model

Control variables:
Age (ns)
Gender **
Computer experience (ns)
Internet experience (ns)
Computing literacy level (ns)
Internet literacy level *

Note: NS: not significant, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001
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and (H1b) which suggest the positive relationship
between general technology awareness with selftechnical controllability and InfoSec self-efficacy.
Hypothesis (H2) is supported to affirm that selftechnical controllability is positively associated with
InfoSec self-efficacy. Hypotheses (H3a, b, c) are
supported to affirm the prediction indicating that
InfoSec self-efficacy is associated with InfoSec
protection effort, InfoSec risk perception, and future
intention to reinforce protection.
Hypothesis (H4a) is also supported, which
predicted that risk propensity is positively associated
with InfoSec protection effort. Contrary to hypothesis
(H4b), risk propensity has positive relationship with
InfoSec risk perception. Hypothesis (H5a) is not
supported, means there is no significant relationship
between current protection effort and InfoSec risk
perception. The result supports hypothesis (H5b),
which indicates that current protection effort is
positively associated with future reinforcement
intention. Finally, the result indicates that InfoSec risk
perception is positively associated with InfoSec
reinforcement intention. Overall, the model explains
43.1% of the variance in respondents’ InfoSec
protection effort, and 15.1% of the variance in
respondents’ InfoSec reinforcement intention.
Table 4. Summary of the results
Hypotheses
β
t-value
Results
H1a: GTA -> SC 0.391 *** 5.594
Supported
H1b: GTA -> SE
0.261 *** 7.384
Supported
H2: SC -> SE
0.465 *** 5.661
Supported
H3a: SE -> PE
0.630 *** 11.898
Supported
H3b: SE -> RPE -0.356 *** 4.622
Supported
H3c: SE -> RI
0.193 ** 2.522
Supported
H4a: RP -> PE
-0.144 ** 1.970
Supported
H4b: RP -> RPE
0.122 *
1.433
Contrary
H5a: PE -> RPE 0.076 NS 0.929
Not supported
H5b: PE -> RI
0.145 ** 1.724
Supported
H6: RPE -> RI
0.259 *** 4.068
Supported
Note: NS: not significant, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.001

Control variables (age, gender, computer
experience, internet experience, computer ownership,
computing literacy level, internet literacy level) are
included in the model. Age, computing literacy level,
and internet literacy level are found to have significant
effects on InfoSec protection effort. Gender, and
internet literacy level are found to have significant
effects on InfoSec reinforcement intention. Computer
experience, and internet experience have no
significant effect on InfoSec protection effort and
InfoSec reinforcement intention.

6. Discussion
By integrating three theories TRA, TPB, and selfefficacy theory, this research contributes to both
theory and practice in the examination of how selfefficacy and risk-related variables are related to
InfoSec protection intention. This research proposes a
model that aims to enhance understanding about
computer user InfoSec protection behavior and
reinforcement intention. The study’s results show that
the model’s independent variables explain an adequate
amount of variance in the proposed model’s dependent
variable. InfoSec self-efficacy, InfoSec protection
effort, and InfoSec risk perception are found to have
positive effect on InfoSec reinforcement intention.
Computer users’ general technology awareness and
InfoSec self-technical controllability would impact on
their InfoSec self-efficacy.
6.1 Theoretical contributions
This study offers implication for InfoSec researchers.
First, this study proposes and validates a research
model that using TRA, TPB and self-efficacy theory
to examine computer users’ InfoSec protection
reinforcement intention. The findings indicate that
InfoSec self-efficacy, current protection behavior, and
InfoSec risk perception are predictors for user’s
InfoSec reinforcement intention. In fact, InfoSec risk
perception is found to have the strongest effect on
protection intention. Therefore, TRA, TPB, and selfefficacy theory provide a better understanding of the
factor that impact on computer users’ InfoSec
reinforcement intention.
Second, the study examines the role of risk
propensity, a user characteristic, on InfoSec current
protection effort and InfoSec risk perception. The
results indicate that risk propensity has negative
impact on InfoSec current protection effort. Contrary
to literature in risk propensity, risk propensity has
positively impact on InfoSec risk perception. When an
individual has high risk propensity (risk-taking
propensity), he or she are more willing to take risk. But
it doesn’t mean that individual perceives less InfoSec
risk than risk-averter person, in fact, they perceive
more InfoSec risk to their computers. Thus, the effect
of risk propensity on risk perception depends on the
domain. These findings on risk propensity has
important implication. People’s propensity to take risk
or avoid risk can explain their intention to perform
protection behavior. The explanation is risk propensity
impacts on people’s perception on InfoSec risk and
their attitudes toward InfoSec protection behavior.
According to TRA and TPB, attitude is an important
antecedent of behavior intention. So examining risk
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propensity in the framework of TRA and TPB offers
researchers a new direction in investigating behavior
intention.
Third, this study provides further support to
findings in the extant literature that InfoSec selfefficacy does have effects on computer users’ InfoSec
protection effort and InfoSec reinforcement intention.
Especially, InfoSec self-efficacy has strong effect on
InfoSec protection effort. In conclusion, the study
helps to develop a new understanding of InfoSec
protection behavior of computer users.
Fourth, the results indicate that computer
experience and internet experience have no effect on
InfoSec protection effort and reinforcement intention.
In other words, there is indifference in InfoSec
protection between long-term computer users and
newbies. People who use the systems for a longer time
are not more likely to protect their computers and
information than people who are new users. While
experience is not an indicator for InfoSec protection,
computing literacy level and Internet level are
significant predictors for InfoSec protection. When
users have higher level of expertise and familiarity
with computers and internet, they have enough
knowledge and skills to protect their computers from
InfoSec threats. Therefore, these users are more likely
to conduct InfoSec protection procedures and
reinforce them.
6.2 Practical implications
This study also provides several practical
implications. First, this research suggests that when
computer users perceive high InfoSec risk, they are
more likely to reinforce their InfoSec protection
procedures. Many computer users do not recognize
that they may have security threat when using
computers and the Internet, or do not know how to
protect their computers from cyberattack. Companies
can enhance employees’ InfoSec protection intention
by informing them what kind of computer usage
behavior are risky. Companies can launch InfoSec
awareness campaigns and training for their employees.
By providing employees with necessary knowledge
and skills, companies can make positive change in
InfoSec protection intention, which lead to strengthen
InfoSec protection behavior and improvement in
organizations’ information system security.
Second, the findings indicate that when people
already act on InfoSec protection procedures, they are
more likely not only continue doing that in the future
and but also put more effort on that. This is a positive
finding for companies. When companies motivate
their employees to have InfoSec compliance, they are
not only enhancing employee protection behavior but

also training them to get a new habit. Previous studies
indicate that habit has a significant role in the context
of employee’s compliances with company InfoSec
policies [27]. When InfoSec protection becomes a
habit, employees will continue following InfoSec
policies without strong enforcement from managers.
They are accustomed to perform protection behavior.
In order to achieve that, companies have to build a
culture that encourage InfoSec compliances. Also,
they need to set clear, feasible InfoSec policies so
employees can perform them easily and effectively.
6.3 Limitation and future research
The study is about computer and internet usage
behavior which some questions related to riskybehaviors. Those questions may make participants
provide socially desirable responses. Also there are
some questions that used technical terms like “filesharing software” or “Web installed mobile codes”
that some computer users may not be familiar with, so
those kind of question will also influence the results.
The sample of the study has a limitation to represent
general population because most participants are
college students.
This study examines what factors influence
computer users’ InfoSec protection behavior. There
are several directions of the future research. Future
research could continue examine users’ characteristics
and their influence on users’ protection behaviors.
Another potential study can also focus on InfoSec risk
exposure behaviors in more specific situation like
online shopping or social network sites with different
cultural perspectives. In mobile social networking
environments, for example, it would be an interesting
study to example users’ risk propensity and their
influence on InfoSec protection behavior in countries
with high and low uncertainty avoidance. Computer
users in high uncertainty avoidance countries have a
tendency to avoid uncertainty or risk, while users from
low uncertainty countries might be more prone to take
risk.

7. Conclusion
With the increasing number of security threats
and cybercrimes, there is a need to understanding what
influence people intention in InfoSec protection. This
research examined InfoSec protection intention and
reinforcement intention by drawing from relevant
behavioral intention theories TRA, TPB, and selfefficacy theory. A survey of computer users’ behavior
and risk characteristic was conducted. The results
show that InfoSec reinforcement intention is
influenced by InfoSec self-efficacy, InfoSec risk
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perception, and InfoSec protection effort. The study
contributes to our understanding of InfoSec protection
behavior.
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